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 KEY POINTS
• As countries move to achieve net-zero targets there is a risk their industries will relocate to countries 
where emitting CO2 is cheaper and easier.
• An option for addressing this so-called carbon leakage is applying domestic carbon prices to imported 
products, or Carbon Border Adjustment (CBA). Both the UK and US are considering CBA and the EU has 
committed to introducing it. 
• It’s still unclear how exactly CBA will be designed and the EU Commission will publish a proposal in July. 
• CBA design offers up a trilemma between the policy goals of environmental ambition, technical feasibility 
and fairness.
• This trilemma means that there is no optimal solution for CBA design, but rather trade-offs between goals.
• CBA also gives rise to the need for new forms of trade and climate cooperation to determine which other 
countries or producers have equivalent pricing, and therefore should be exempted. This might mean simply 
agreeing broad shared aims, such as net-zero targets, or much more detailed sector-specific analysis. 
• The upcoming G7 and COP, both hosted by the UK, provide an opportunity to make progress on these crucial 
questions for designing CBA and forming a larger transatlantic climate alliance. 
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INTRODUCTION
It seems the time has come for countries to start 
extending domestic carbon prices to foreign products, 
often referred to as Carbon Border Adjustment (CBA). 
The European Parliament recently voted1 to apply 
a so-called Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
starting in January 2023. The Biden Administration 
may also introduce US CBA.2  And Prime Minister 
Johnson has indicated that he wants to make CBA a 
1 European Parliament, ‘Carbon levy on EU imports needed to 
raise global climate ambition’ Press Releases ENVI Committee, 
05-02-2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20210201IPR96812/carbon-levy-on-eu-imports-needed-to-
raise-global-climate-ambition (11 May 2021)  
2 The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental 
Justice, Part III. https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (11 May 2021)
central issue when the UK hosts the G7 in June.3
Why is this issue at the top of the agenda? In short, 
countries are worried that the cost of decarbonising 
their industries will make them globally uncompetitive. 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), in particular, 
is starting to do what it’s designed for – make high-
emissions manufacturing processes too expensive, 
and coal prohibitively so. The European Steel 
Association (EUROFER) estimates that the ETS will 
3 J. Shankleman, ‘U.K.’s Boris Johnson Considers G-7 Bid on Green 
Border Levies’, Bloomberg, 4 February 2021 https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2021-02-04/u-k-s-boris-johnson-considers-g-7-
bid-on-green-border-levies (11 May 2021).
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cost it €34 billion euros between 2021-30.4 The 
current record price, €49 (£43)/tonne at the time 
of writing is causing EU industry outcry,5 but to be 
effective the price needs to bite harder. The Grantham 
Institute concludes that to achieve net-zero emissions 
by 2050 (the UK target) pricing will have to reach 
£75/tonne by 2030.6
With higher costs comes the risk that industries in 
countries with ambitious climate targets will simply 
relocate to countries where they can emit freely. 
Estimates of the extent to which this so-called carbon 
leakage is happening vary, but the higher the price 
of carbon, the more likely this is. This threatens not 
only domestic industries but also, more importantly, 
the climate benefit of carbon pricing. These are the 
twin problems that carbon border adjustment aims to 
address, by applying charges to imported goods that 
are equivalent to those domestic producers pay. 
Border adjustment tax is not a new idea,7 and is 
based on the principle that products should be 
taxed where they’re consumed not produced. But 
adjusting carbon taxes is particularly tricky. Among 
other challenges, it requires translating a tax often 
applied to producers to products instead,8 calculating 
embodied CO2,
9 and deciding whether developing 
countries should be charged less to reflect their 
differing responsibilities. Choices made here also 
4 M. Moggridge, ‘EUROFER offers practical solutions for EU 
ETS’ Steel Times International, 28 October 2015, https://www.
steeltimesint.com/news/eurofer-offers-practical-solutions-for-eu-ets 
(11 May 2021)
5 An independent UK ETS is due to begin in the second quarter of 
2021 and the permit price remains unknown.
6 J. Burke, R. Byrnes, S. Frankhauser, ‘How to price carbon to 
reach net-zero’, Policy Publications LSE/Grantham Institute, May 
2019. https://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/how-to-
price-carbon-to-reach-net-zero-emissions-in-the-uk/
7 See eg, this GATT report: BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS Report of 
the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 (L/3464). https://
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.download 
(11 May 2021)
8 For WTO purposes, as set out in the 1970 GATT Border 
Adjustment Tax report linked above, to be adjusted carbon tax must 
be applied to products, not producers. Therefore the EU will need to 
argue that the EU ETS applies indirectly to products. There is some 
support for this interpretation in WTO case law and Agreements (see 
analysis in Pauwelyn, J. and Kleimann, D, Trade Related Aspects of a 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A legal assessment, Briefing 
for the INTA Committee, European Parliament, pp. 8-9). But the fact 
remains that, in the EU, companies buy permits that correspond 
with their overall emissions, and applying this permit price to an 
imported product requires a different approach: identifying how many 
emissions are inside a product.
9 This is far from straightforward. See, eg, J. Orr, O. Gibbons 
and W. Arnold, ‘A brief guide to calculating embodied carbon’, 
thestructuralengineer.org, July 2020: https://www.istructe.org/
IStructE/media/Public/TSE-Archive/2020/A-brief-guide-to-calculating-
embodied-carbon.pdf (11 May 2021)
affect the likelihood of CBAM complying with WTO 
rules. 
THE CBA TRILEMMA
In advance of the EU Commission’s CBA proposal 
in July, which will provide some answers to these 
questions, I offer here a conceptual framework for 
evaluating design choices of CBA, in terms of a 
trilemma between environmental ambition, technical 
feasibility and fairness. With apologies to dedicated 
CBA watchers for some omissions and simplification, 
this will help to illustrate some of the tradeoffs 
involved in CBA design and what they might mean for 
various stakeholders – from SMEs to customs agents 
to environmentalists – and the prospect of forming 
climate clubs  between countries with net-zero 
emissions targets going forward.
CBA has different sets of goals, which in some 
respects pull in different directions. This means there 
are no right answers in CBA design, but there are 
tradeoffs. 
ENVIRONMENTAL AIMS:  Scope – broad. Rate 
– high and targeted.
Given that it acts as an extension of a domestic 
climate regulation, reducing emissions is arguably 
the primary aim of CBA. Anytime domestic products 
pay a carbon tax that foreign products do not, it 
gives an advantage to higher-emitting products. Thus, 
environmentally speaking, CBA should be applied to 
all products that are taxed domestically. It also must 
apply to all manufactured products that contain inputs 
that are taxed. If it doesn’t, leakage (ie, production 
shifting to emissions havens) will still occur for these 
inputs. Pricing shouldn’t just cover the emissions 
released directly during the production of these 
products, but also the cost of purchased inputs, such 
as electricity – so-called indirect emissions. Finally, 
leakage isn’t necessarily limited to sectors covered 
by carbon pricing. Other types of climate regulation 
can also be expensive for producers. Thus, there is 
an argument for looking beyond direct pricing when 
evaluating which sectors bear greater costs than their 
foreign counterparts. Agriculture, for example, is often 
cited by producers as a source of leakage within the 
EU.10 
We also have to settle on a methodology for 
determining how many emissions are embodied 
in each imported shipment of goods. From an 
10  C Lambert, ‘Carbon leakage devastating for European 
agriculture’, Future Farming, 9 March 2021. https://www.
futurefarming.com/Smart-farmers/Articles/2021/3/Carbon-leakage-
devastating-for-European-agriculture-718961E/ (11 May 2021)
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environmental perspective, we shouldn’t use default 
values that allow many producers to pay less than 
they actually emit. We want the price to prevent 
leakage and ultimately help incentivize companies 
to use cleaner technologies (though of course CBA 
can’t prevent countries from exporting their cleaner 
products and consuming higher-emitting products 
domestically, or exporting it to non-CBA countries). 
Therefore, it’s important that CBA is high enough 
to be dissuasive, and that it reflects the actual 
emissions of imported products so that bad actors 
feel the effects more.   
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AIMS:  Scope – 
narrow. Rate – standardized.
From a technical feasibility perspective, calculating 
the emissions profile of each individual installation 
places an administrative burden on companies. This 
is particularly true for smaller companies, and for 
manufactured goods – imagine, for example, that the 
steel in a car comes from Japan but the aluminium 
from China. Each of the producers of these materials 
has their own individual emissions rates that must 
be calculated and summed. This is burdensome for 
businesses but also poses challenges in assessing 
compliance. To determine if charges are correct, 
customs officers (or whoever is responsible for 
levying the tax) will need to understand the pricing 
methodology being employed by each producer for 
each component.  
Changing rates can also make applying CBA and 
assessing compliance more difficult. If the EU 
envisages its CBA as an extension of its ETS, the 
price will constantly shift based on ETS permit prices. 
Reflecting these changes is important to make this 
an accurate adjustment tax, but dealing with price 
changes on top of everything else clearly adds a layer 
of complexity. If we leave aside all environmental and 
fairness considerations, the easiest way to administer 
such a scheme is to use fixed default values for the 
emissions embedded in particular goods, preferably 
global averages. Furthermore, the narrower the 
scope, the easier to apply. If we limit CBA to direct 
emissions for a few primary commodities, we avoid 
all the complexities involved in calculating inputs for 
manufactured goods. 
FAIRNESS AIMS (WTO, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES) :  Scope – narrow. Rate: low if 
generalized; targeting must be allowed if charges are 
higher than actual emissions. 
An inconvenient truth about carbon border adjustment 
is that one of its aims is to protect domestic industry 
from foreign competition. Thus, the CBA has to be 
crafted quite scrupulously to avoid being seen as 
discriminatory. WTO non-discrimination rules provide 
some scope for trade-restrictive measures such as 
CBA, as long as they treat domestic and imported 
products the same (National Treatment) as well as 
products from all WTO members (Most Favoured 
Nation).11  From a design perspective, this means 
ensuring that producers are being charged the same 
rate of tax per unit as domestic producers, and that 
the amount of emissions considered to be embodied 
11  For more analysis of WTO-compatibility, see eg, M. Mehling et al, 
Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action 
(2019) 113(3) American Journal of International Law 461; J. Hillman, 
‘Changing climate for carbon taxes: Who’s afraid of the WTO?’ 
Climate and Energy paper series 2013, German Marshall Fund, pp7-
9.
Figure 1. The CBA Trilemma
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in their products is calculated fairly and accurately. 
This is complicated by the fact that fairness and 
accuracy may mean different things to different 
trade partners. Those who share net-zero emissions 
targets, for example, may argue that regardless 
of their exact pricing strategies, their producers 
should be exempted, because they are undertaking 
regulations with equivalent effect. Those who do not 
share net-zero targets may argue that CBA illegally 
exceeds the obligations of the Paris Agreement, which 
allows each country to set its own emissions targets 
and strategy, not pay for others to achieve theirs. 
The latter is particularly acute with respect to 
developing countries. Historically, they did not 
emit as much and thus have less responsibility to 
reduce emission now. Also, for a subset, including 
Least Developed Countries, their contribution to 
contemporary emissions is much lower. Both the 
WTO12 and also the Paris Agreement13 contain legal 
principles that allow for differential treatment of 
developing countries, and which arguably should 
be applied here in some form.14 However, countries 
who define themselves as developing are also some 
of the world’s biggest emitters.15 Also, if some 
countries are being charged, while others are not, 
either on the basis of their contribution to climate 
change mitigation or their development status, this 
might form the basis of a (Most Favoured Nation) 
discrimination complaint.
These factors point to the likelihood of a WTO 
complaint on CBA. The fact that the WTO Appellate 
Body, or high court, is currently out of action adds an 
additional element of legal uncertainty, and, in making 
the trading system more volatile, probably increases 
the likelihood of tariff retaliation against CBA. But 
certain design principles are obviously desirable 
to make it less likely that trade partners will raise 
objections. In order to stand the best chance of WTO 
survival, the price per unit of emissions must be the 
12  Special and Differential Treatment provisions, World Trade 
Organisation, website article.  https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm (11 May 
2021).
13  Climate Nexus, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). https://climatenexus.org/
climate-change-news/common-but-differentiated-responsibilities-and-
respective-capabilities-cbdr-rc/
14  One proposal is here: S. Lowe, ‘The EU’s Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism: how to make it work for developing 
countries’, Centre for European Reform, 22 April 2021. https://www.
cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/eus-carbon-border-
adjustment-mechanism-how-make-it-work (11 May 2021)
15  J Friedrich, M Ge, ‘This Interactive Chart shows changes in the 
top 10 global emitters.’ World Resources Institute, 10 December 
2020. https://www.wri.org/insights/interactive-chart-shows-changes-
worlds-top-10-emitters (11 May 2021). 
same for domestic producers and all trade partners, 
and any default charges for embedded emissions 
in particular products should be equal or lower to 
those that domestic producers pay on average. There 
must be an appeal mechanism where individual 
installations can calculate their own individual 
emissions. And in overseeing this complex process, 
the CBA must be administered fairly: a clear and 
transparent methodology for calculating emissions 
rates and an accessible route for obtaining approval 
for lower rates. 
Finally, to be seen as non-discriminatory, it’s 
important that CBA is explicitly framed as a measure 
to achieve climate objectives, rather than support 
domestic industry. In the WTO, GATT Article XX 
provides a ‘general exception’ under which a CBA can 
be defended as an environmental measure, but this 
exception requires that trade-restrictive regulation 
be necessary to achieve its environmental objective, 
and that there be a strong means-ends relationship 
between the measure and its objective. Both of these 
suggest that CBA will be most likely to pass the 
WTO test if it focuses only on highly-traded primary 
commodities where it is easiest to prove that leakage 
is already happening. This is a subset of the ETS 
coverage, rather than the whole scope. Charging CBA 
on sectors where there is no ETS, such as agriculture, 
seems very unlikely to pass the non-discrimination 
test, as it goes beyond adjusting a domestic tax. 
CBA PROPOSALS – TRADEOFFS AND 
THE TRILEMMA
Putting these together reveals that charging a 
narrower range of imported products is preferable 
from a technical feasibility and WTO perspective, but 
may undermine environmental objectives by exempting 
some sectors in which leakage isn’t captured by 
pricing, and also allowing for leakage in inputs to 
manufactured goods. A targeted approach that 
reflects each producer’s actual emissions is easier to 
justify from a WTO and environmental perspective, but 
much more challenging to implement. Indeed, it would 
be so complex to administer that, unless it’s done 
very carefully, it may lead to WTO complaints focusing 
on administrative unfairness. Higher prices are better 
environmentally, but more likely to prompt companies 
to lobby their governments to initiate a WTO dispute. 
Exempting at least some developing countries from 
CBA charges is desirable to achieve fairness – but, if 
done too widely, has the potential to raise tensions 
with the environmental goals.
No country has yet offered a comprehensive design; 
the closest we have is a European Parliament 
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Resolution16, which scores relatively high on the 
environmental goals of the trilemma but lower on 
technical ones. It proposes that CBAM cover all 
products made with materials charged under the ETS, 
including manufactured goods and indirect emissions 
(ie the electricity purchased to power manufacturing 
plants). It also proposes that producers can 
determine individually how much they should be 
charged based on their own emission profile and 
whether they pay domestic carbon tax. The resolution 
is a bit weak on developing countries, saying only 
that ‘special consideration’ will be given to Least 
Developed Countries and Small Island Developing 
States. The European Commission proposal,17 due in 
July, may well propose different tradeoffs. 
In the US, the picture is even less clear, with Kerry 
recently describing CBA as a ‘last resort’.18 If, 
however, the US decided to introduce CBA, it’s very 
difficult to see how it could do so in a way that would 
fulfil the requirements of WTO non-discrimination. 
Whilst most states that hug the coasts do price 
carbon, there is no national carbon price or trading 
scheme. The US would thus have to make an 
argument for applying a tax to imports that its own 
producers don’t face, which would be very difficult to 
justify in the WTO. 
CBAM DESIGN DECISIONS AND THE 
CLIMATE CLUB
Just as no country has yet designed a CBA, none has 
provided guidance for how to avoid it. Carbon leakage 
is an obstacle – political as much as environmental 
– to net-zero targets, and an ambitious multilateral 
solution isn’t on the table yet. The basic idea of a 
climate club19 is that, absent a high international 
carbon price, countries with ambitious climate targets 
band together against the rest of the world and 
impose import duties on them. Countries in the club 
do not need to levy CBA on each other, and the idea 
is that if enough countries do this, then this increases 
the incentives for others to join the club, and limits 
the need for CBAs. 
16  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2021 towards 
a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(2020/2043(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/TA-9-2021-0071_EN.html (11 May 2021). 
17  European Commission, EU Green Deal (carbon border 
adjustment mechanism). https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-EU-Green-Deal-carbon-
border-adjustment-mechanism-_en (11 May 2021). 
18  M Khan et al, ‘New US climate strategy opens up old faultlines 
with Europe’, Financial Times, 23 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/
content/b95de724-75c8-4155-88ed-5808fb761942 (11 May 2021)
19  Above n. 11. 
CONCLUSION
Questions remain unanswered about which 
countries will apply CBA, how it will be designed 
and on what basis countries will exempt each 
other. If countries share a net-zero emissions 
by 2050 ambition, is this enough to exempt all 
exports? Or is this a much more granular process 
of determining equivalence in carbon charges 
across products and sectors? The recently-
concluded UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
provides a potential template. It’s the first to 
commit both Parties to maintaining effective carbon 
pricing20 and to work toward linking their Emissions 
Trading Schemes (which would effectively guarantee 
that they have the same basis for national 
carbon pricing). This however is backed up by an 
enforcement mechanism that allows either side to 
impose tariffs if the other isn’t keeping pace. 
It remains unclear what it will take to be exempted 
from EU CBAM. This in turn is important for global 
trade and climate cooperation, and the prospect of 
forming climate clubs. The UK has not yet produced 
a domestic proposal on CBA. However, as a country 
that has committed to net-zero by 2050 target and 
the host of the upcoming G7 and COP, it is well 
situated to convene these discussions on making 
climate clubs a reality, and will hopefully take up 
the challenge. 
20  See M Gehring, ‘The UK-EU Agreement is the first to make 
climate a make or break issue,’ UK in a Changing Europe, 21 January 
2021. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-eu-uk-agreement-is-the-first-to-
make-climate-a-make-or-break-issue/ (11 May 2021). 
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